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Our decisions are guided by the rewards we expect. These expectations are often based
on incomplete knowledge and are thus subject to uncertainty. While the neurophysiology
of expected rewards is well understood, less is known about the physiology of uncer-
tainty. We hypothesize that uncertainty, or more speciﬁcally errors in judging uncertainty,
are reﬂected in pupil dilation, a marker that has frequently been associated with decision
making, but so far has remained largely elusive to quantitative models.To test this hypoth-
esis, we measure pupil dilation while observers perform an auditory gambling task. This
task dissociates two key decision variables – uncertainty and reward – and their errors
from each other and from the act of the decision itself.We ﬁrst demonstrate that the pupil
does not signal expected reward or uncertainty per se, but instead signals surprise, that
is, errors in judging uncertainty. While this general ﬁnding is independent of the precise
quantiﬁcation of these decision variables, we then analyze this effect with respect to a spe-
ciﬁc mathematical model of uncertainty and surprise, namely risk and risk prediction error.
Using this quantiﬁcation, we ﬁnd that pupil dilation and risk prediction error are indeed
highly correlated. Under the assumption of a tight link between noradrenaline (NA) and
pupil size under constant illumination, our data may be interpreted as empirical evidence
for the hypothesis that NA plays a similar role for uncertainty as dopamine does for reward,
namely the encoding of error signals.
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INTRODUCTION
From simple motor tasks to complex ﬁnancial transactions, deci-
sions are at the core of human behavior. It is often assumed that
decisions are mainly driven by the desire to maximize expected
reward. However, expected rewards are frequently uncertain. This
uncertainty affects behavior and learning in addition to the expec-
tation itself. When expectations are not met, surprise arises: The
more certain one had been about an expectation that turned out to
be wrong, the more surprised one will be. Thus, a full description
of the decision making process requires – beyond measures of
expected reward – robust markers of uncertainty and surprise.
Here we investigate pupil dilation as an outwardly accessible,
physiological marker of decision variables. Pupil dilation under
constant illumination has been associated with a variety of cog-
nitive functions. In the context of decision making, the pupil has
been related to qualitative concepts such as arousal (Bradshaw,
1967), alertness (Yoss et al., 1970), or the decision process itself
(Simpson and Hale, 1969). Despite decades of psychophysiolog-
ical research, up to now, a quantitative link between the pupil
and precisely deﬁned decision variables has been lacking. Recently,
Gilzenrat et al. (2010) as well as Jepma and Nieuwenhuis (2011)
provided quantitative assessments of pupil dilation in the context
of shifts between exploitation (task engagement) and exploration
(disengagement). While decision variables were present in their
paradigms, they were not the primary object of study and need
to be estimated from the observers’ subjective choices. Out of the
many studies that have considered the pupil in decision making,
to the best of our knowledge, our study is the ﬁrst that is designed
explicitly to dissociate the contributions of distinct decision vari-
ables, here risk and reward and their errors, to the pupil response
in a quantitative way.
Two lines of research inspired the present study. First, con-
verging evidence from electrophysiology (Rajkowski et al., 1993,
1994), pharmacology (Phillips et al., 2000), anatomy (Samuels and
Szabadi, 2008 for review), and human imaging (Sterpenich et al.,
2006; but see Astaﬁev et al., 2010) points to a tight link between
pupil dilationunder constant illumination and the neurotransmit-
ter noradrenaline (NA). Second, a recent modeling study reviewed
primarily electrophysiological studies of the noradrenergic sys-
tem and concluded that phasic NA activity may signal unexpected
uncertainty (a form of surprise; Dayan and Yu, 2006). Linking
these two lines of research, we hypothesized that the pupil signals
surprise. To test this hypothesis, we asked participants to perform
an auditory gambling task, while their pupil dilation was mea-
sured. Not only do we ﬁnd a quantitative match between surprise
and the pupil size, but we also dissociate it from expected reward,
which contributes little to nothing to the pupil response. More
intriguingly, the formalization of surprise (i.e., unexpected uncer-
tainty) as risk prediction error (RE) allows us its dissociation from
expected uncertainty (formalized as risk). As such, we explicitly
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link pupil data to mathematically well-deﬁned decision variables.
Using the purported link between pupil and NA, another intrigu-
ing corollary follows: in this view, NA takes the same function for
risk as dopamine does for reward – signaling prediction error.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Twelve volunteers from the Philipps-University Marburg commu-
nity participated in the study (5 male, 7 female; mean age: 25.7,
age range: 19–47). All participants had normal or corrected to
normal vision and gave written informed consent. All procedures
conformed with national and institutional guidelines for the use
of human subjects and with the Declaration of Helsinki.
BEHAVIORAL PARADIGM
Participants played an auditory gambling task adapted from a pre-
viously used task (Preuschoff et al., 2006); to ensure constant low
illumination, all stimuli (cards) and instructions were presented
through speakers instead of being visually displayed (Figure 1).
Two cards were drawn (without replacement within each trial)
from a deck of 10, numbered 1 through 10. Before hearing either
card, participants used a gamepad to place a $1 bet on whether
the ﬁrst or the second card would be higher. Five seconds after the
bet was placed, card 1 was sounded through the speakers, followed
5 s later by card 2. Five seconds after the presentation of card 2,
participants were asked to report through the gamepad whether
they won $1 or lost $1. In case of an incorrect response partici-
pants lost $0.25, independent of whether their gamble had paid
off. Reward level was kept constant across all trials. Because of this,
expected reward and risk upon display of the ﬁrst card change only
as a function of the probability of winning. To ensure participants
motivation, they started with $25 of gambling money, and $1 of
gambling money was converted into C0.20 real money at the end
of the experiment.
Participants reported their win/loss outcome reliably, with cor-
rect answers in at least 87/90 (96.7%) trials (average: 88.75/90).
Only these trials (1065 in total, i.e., 98.6% of all trials) were used
FIGURE 1 | Auditory gambling task. In each trial auditory instructions ask
participants to place a bet whether the second card will be lower or higher
than the ﬁrst one. Five seconds after the response the ﬁrst card is drawn,
5 s later the second card and further 5 s later participants have to indicate
whether they have lost or won. All instructions are given auditorily through
speakers, while participants maintain ﬁxation. All details for computation of
reward, risk, and risk prediction error as well as the numerical values for all
possible combinations of cards are given in the Section “Mathematical
Details – Models of Expected Reward, Uncertainty (Risk), and Surprise
(Risk Prediction Error).”
for analysis. Participants placed both bets about equally often,with
in total 576 (53.2%) bets on“second card higher,”and there was no
pronounced bias in any individual (range: 47.7–63.0% of “second
card higher” bets).
DATA ACQUISITION
Experiments were performed in a black, sound-proof room with
negligible ambient light levels. During the whole experiment eye
position and pupil diameter were monitored with an Eyelink-
2000 (SRResearch,Mississauga,ON,Canada) eye-tracking device.
All data acquisition and analysis were performed in Matlab (The
Mathworks, Natick, MA, USA) including its psychophysics and
eyelink toolbox extensions (http://psychtoolbox.org; Cornelissen
et al., 2002). Participants were instructed to ﬁxate a central spot
throughout each trial. Before each trial the calibration of the eye-
tracker was validated with four additional ﬁxation points and
re-calibrated if needed. Fixation spots were black (<0.01 cd/m2)
on a dark gray background (6 cd/m2) presented on a 21′′ screen
located about 80 cm from the participants. Instructions and drawn
cards were presented through speakers adjacent to the screen. To
achieve standardized conditions, sound ﬁles were generated using
the “Read Out Loud” tool of Adobe Acrobat Professional using
a standard female voice (“Vicky”) of Mac OS X and stored in
wav format for presentation. To familiarize participants with the
sounds and ensure understanding of within trial presentations all
sound ﬁles were played to the participants prior to the experiment,
until participants were sure they understood the content.
PUPIL DATA
Traces of pupil dilation were recorded with at least 500Hz sam-
pling rate (higher sampling rates were used when SNR of the pupil
detection allowed, but all data are downsampled to 500Hz before
any further analysis). Periods of blinks were detected using the
manufacturer’s standard algorithms with default settings. Pupil
dilation during blinks was interpolated by cubic spline interpo-
lation. Responses (bet and indication of win/loss) were recorded
with a gamepad device. For analysis of effects of the ﬁrst card,
pupil traces were aligned at the offset of the card’s presentation.
To facilitate comparison within and across subjects, all traces were
normalized by subtracting the diameter at this time point and
dividing by it, resulting in a percentage signal change measure rel-
ative to card offset. By this normalization any generic effect that
lasts longer than an individual trial (e.g., arousal, fatigue) cannot
confound the results. Similarly, the data referring to the second
card was normalized relative to the draw of the second card.
STATISTICS AND REGRESSION
The time-courses of pupil dilation are compared point-wise by
two-sided t -tests. To correct for multiple comparisons the alpha-
level is adjusted to an expected false-discovery rate of 5% using the
method of Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). The corrected alpha-
level is denoted as FDR0.05 and only time-points with p-values
below this level are referred to as signiﬁcant.
For data of Figures 2D,E, the best ﬁt in the least-squares sense
to the pupil data for the function
f
(
c∗
) = u R1
(
c∗
)+ v pwin,1
(
c∗
)+ w
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FIGURE 2 | First card. (A) Pupil dilation between ﬁrst and second card
relative to the time of drawing the ﬁrst card split by level of uncertainty
after ﬁrst card. Pupil dilates more if the outcome is sure (low uncertainty, light
gray, card was 1 or 10) than for high uncertainty trials (black, cards 4,5,6,7),
while medium uncertainty trials (dark gray, cards 2,3,8,9) fall in between.Thick
lines denote means over participants, thin lines SEM for high and low
uncertainty trials; shaded area denotes time when high uncertainty
signiﬁcantly differs from low uncertainty at an expected FDR of 5%
(p <FDR0.05 =0.042). (B) Signiﬁcance of difference between high and low
uncertainty trials as given in (A). Results of point-wise t -tests for equality of
means; negative logarithmic scale implies values to the top to be more
signiﬁcant (lower p). Horizontal line denotes expected FDR of 5%
(FDR0.05 =0.042), times of signiﬁcant differences fall above. (C) Model:
Probability of winning (gray) and risk (black) after the ﬁrst card is drawn as
function of the ﬁrst card. Expected reward is linear in the probability of
winning. Units of $ (reward) and $2 (risk) omitted. Note that probability of
winning depends on the bet, but risk does not. To pool data over both bets for
the analysis of the ﬁrst card, we exploit symmetry: in case of the bet “second
card higher” the number representing the card is replaced by its mirror
(1→10, 2→9,. . .,10→1) and all bets are treated as “second card lower.”
Mathematically we denote the actual card as “c” and the bet-corrected card
as “c∗” [see Mathematical Details – Models of Expected Reward, Uncertainty
(Risk), and Surprise (Risk Prediction Error)]. (D) Points: Pupil dilation [as in (A)]
at time of peak signiﬁcance between high and low uncertainty sorted by card
(c∗, adjusted for bet); mean and SEM over subjects. The parabola-shape
resulting from the quadratic dependence of risk on c∗ [cf. (C)] is evident. Line:
ﬁt of a model including risk, probability of winning, and a constant offset,
coefﬁcients u, v, and w, respectively. (E) Evolution of ﬁt parameters [as in (D)]
over time. Quickly after the ﬁrst card, the effect of risk (u) rises, while the
effect of reward (and probability of winning, v) shows little systematic change
over time. The contribution of the constant (w) reﬂects the general time
course of pupil dilation over the trial, which happens irrespective of the card’s
value and thus independent of any decision variables. (F) Correlation of pupil
dilation to risk (black) or probability (gray).Top: correlation coefﬁcient, bottom:
probability of correlation being different from 0. Horizontal line denotes 5%
expected FDR for risk (FDR0.05 =0.045).
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is sought, were c∗ denotes the bet-corrected ﬁrst card, R1 risk
after the ﬁrst card (in units of $2) and pwin,1 the probability of
winning after the ﬁrst card, as detailed in the Section “Mathemati-
cal Details – Models of Expected Reward, Uncertainty (Risk), and
Surprise (Risk Prediction Error)” below. The evaluation of the ﬁt
parameters u, v, w over the 5-s period after the ﬁrst card represent
the time course of the effect of risk, expected reward (proportional
to pwin,1) and generic effects that are not related to manipulated
decision variables, respectively.
MATHEMATICAL DETAILS – MODELS OF EXPECTED
REWARD, UNCERTAINTY (RISK), AND SURPRISE (RISK
PREDICTION ERROR)
NOTATION
For each decision variable, we consider three different periods
indicated by subscripts, the time after the bet prior to the ﬁrst card
(subscript 0), the time between the cards (subscript 1) and the
time after the second card (subscript 2). We ﬁrst deﬁne the quan-
tities used. Below we explicitly compute them as functions of the
drawn cards and tabulate the values for each possible constellation
in Tables 1 and 2. E[x] denotes the expectation of x.
c number of the ﬁrst card
c∗ number of the ﬁrst card adjusted for bet (c∗ = c if bet
is “second card lower” and c∗ = 11− c if bet is “second
card higher”)
pwin,0 probability of winning before hearing card 1
(pwin,0 = 0.5 for all trials)
pwin,1 probability of winning after hearing card 1
(pwin,1 ∈ {0, 1/9,..., 8/9, 1})
pwin,2 probability of winning after hearing card 2
(pwin,2 ∈ {0, 1})
P0 expected reward before hearing card 1, prediction of
P1, i.e., P0 = E[P1]
P1 expected reward after hearing card 1, prediction of P2,
i.e., P1 = E[P2]
P2 actual reward, revealed upon display of card 2
(P2 ∈ {−$1, +$1})
PE1 reward prediction error after ﬁrst card PE1 = (P1 − P0)
PE2 reward prediction error after second card
PE2 = (P2 − P1)
R0 risk before hearing card 1 (R0 = E[(P1 − P0)2]= 33/81
for all trials)
R1 risk after hearing card 1 (R1 = E[(P2 − P1)2])
R2 risk after hearing card 2,R2 = 0 for all trials as outcome
is known for certain
RE1 risk prediction error after hearing card 1 ((PE21−R0) =
(P1−P0)2−E[(P1−P0)2]), actual minus expected size
of reward prediction error at card 1
RE2 risk prediction error after hearing card 2 ((PE22−R1) =
(P2−P1)2−E[(P2−P1)2]), actual minus expected size
of reward prediction error at card 2
The values are a function of the bet placed and the cards drawn.
The values for all possible constellations are given inTables 1 and2.
Note that reward, and absolute reward prediction error have
the unit of $, whereas risk, squared reward prediction error and
risk prediction error have the unit of $2. Both are omitted in tables,
ﬁgures, and text for brevity.
Before hearing card 1
At t = 0, prior to the ﬁrst card, the decision variables are indepen-
dent of cards and choice. In particular, the probability of winning,
pwin,0 = 0.5, and consequently the expected reward
P0 = pwin,0 ∗ 1 +
(
1 − pwin,0
) ∗ (−1) = 0
Risk R0 is given by the variance (or more precisely, the second
moment) of the expected reward
R0 = E[(P1 − P0)2] = 1
10
((−1)2 + (−7/9)2 + (−5/9)2
+ . . . + (7/9)2 + (1)2) = 33/81 = 0.41
This is the expected size of the prediction error at card 1. There
are 10 possible prediction errors that could obtain when card 1 is
displayed, all of which are equally likely to occur. The risk is the
same for all trials.
At hearing card 1
After the ﬁrst card, the value of all variables depends on the card
drawn (c∗). The probability of winning and the expected reward
can be expressed as
pwin,1 = c
∗ − 1
9
P1 = pwin,1 ∗ 1 +
(
1 − pwin,1
) ∗ (−1)
= 2pwin,1 − 1
= 2 (c
∗ − 5.5)
9
respectively.
The reward prediction error is PE1 = (P1 − P0) and thus equals
the expected reward, P1.
Risk is the expectation of (P2 − P1)2 taken over P2 (which is
either−1 or 1 depending on whether the subject lost or won). Risk
is given as
R1 = E
[
(P2 − P1)2
]
= pwin,1 ∗ (1 − P1)2 +
(
1 − pwin,1
) ∗ (−1 − P1)2
= pwin,1 ∗
(
2 − 2pwin,1
)2 + (1 − pwin,1
) ∗ (2pwin,1
)2
= 4pwin,1 − 4p2win,1
∝ −RE1
The risk prediction error is given as
RE1 = (P1 − P0)2 − E
[
(P1 − P0)2
]
= (P1 − P0)2 − R0
= (2pwin,1 − 1
)2 − R0
= 4p2win,1 − 4pwin,1 + (1 − R0)
∝ −R1
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Table 1 | Decision variables after the first card (units of $ and $2 are omitted).
Bet First
card (c)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Second
card lower
c∗ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
pwin,1 0 1/9 2/9 3/9 4/9 5/9 6/9 7/9 8/9 1
P1 −1 −0.78 −0.56 −0.33 −0.11 +0.11 +0.33 +0.56 +0.78 +1
Second
card higher
c∗ 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
pwin,1 0 8/9 7/9 6/9 5/9 4/9 3/9 2/9 1/9 0
P1 +1 +0.78 +0.56 +0.33 +0.11 −0.11 −0.33 −0.56 −0.78 −1
Either bet R1 0 32/81=
0.40
56/81=
0.69
72/81=
0.89
80/81=
0.99
80/81=
0.99
72/81=
0.89
56/81=
0.69
32/81=
0.40
0
RE1 48/81 16/81 −8/81 −24/81 −32/81 −32/81 −24/81 −8/81 16/81 48/81
See Section “Mathematical Details – Models of Expected Reward, Uncertainty (Risk), and Surprise (Risk Prediction Error)” for formulas.
Table 2 | Decision variables after the second card (units of $ and $2 are omitted); note that there is no win in case of c∗ =1 (pwin =0) and no loss
in case of c∗ =10 (pwin =1).
c∗ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Win P2 – $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1 $1
PE22 – 256/81=
3.16
196/81=
2.42
144/81=
1.78
100/81=
1.23
64/81=
0.79
36/81=
0.44
16/81=
0.20
4/81=
0.05
0
RE2 – 224/81=
2.77
140/81=
1.73
72/81=
0.89
20/81=
0.25
−16/81=
−0.20
−36/81=
−0.44
−40/81=
−0.49
−28/81=
−0.35
0
Loss P2 −$1 −$1 −$1 −$1 −$1 −$1 −$1 −$1 −$1 –
PE22 0 4/81=
0.05
16/81=
0.20
36/81=
0.44
64/81=
0.79
100/81=
1.23
144/81=
1.78
196/81=
2.42
256/81=
3.16
–
RE2 0 −28/81=
−0.35
−40/81=
−0.49
−36/81=
−0.44
−16/81=
−0.20
20/81=
0.25
72/81=
0.89
140/81=
1.73
224/81=
2.77
–
See Section “Mathematical Details – Models of Expected Reward, Uncertainty (Risk), and Surprise (Risk Prediction Error)” for formulas.
Note, that at the ﬁrst card the correlation between risk and risk
prediction error is −1.
At hearing card 2
Analogous computations can be made for risk prediction errors
at card 2. The outcome P2 is either −1 (subject lost bet) or +1
(subject won). The risk prediction errors at card 2 are obtained
by comparing the squared reward prediction error with the risk
predicted before card 2 (but after card 1; Figure 4C; Table 2) and
work out to
RE2 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
4 − 12pwin,1 + 8p2win,1 for P2 = −1(i.e., a loss and
thus pwin,2 = 0)
−4pwin,1 + 8p2win,1 for P2 = 1(i.e., a win and
thus pwin,2 = 1)
RESULTS
Participants performed 90 trials of an auditory gambling task
(Figure 1): before a sequence of two different cards (represented
by numbers between 1 and 10) was drawn, participants had to bet
whether the second card would be higher or lower than the ﬁrst;
5 s after the bet, the ﬁrst card is drawn, followed 5 s later by the sec-
ond card. The experimental paradigm segregates the act of making
a decision (before ﬁrst card) from the availability of associated
decision variables (after the ﬁrst or second card). Since on each
trial a fresh deck of 10 cards was used, participants started with
no information on the outcome of the gamble and the outcome
was independent of participants’ strategy. In each trial, before the
ﬁrst card, the probability of winning is 0.5 and the uncertainty is
constant [refer to the section Mathematical Details – Models of
Expected Reward, Uncertainty (Risk), and Surprise (Risk Predic-
tion Error) for technical details, here and hereafter]. After the ﬁrst
card is drawn, participants update their estimates of the decision
variables: for betting “second card lower” the probability of win-
ning increases in the number of the ﬁrst card, for betting “second
card higher,” the probability decreases. Irrespective of the bet, the
participant will be sure (no uncertainty) whenever the ﬁrst card
is a “1” or “10,” have medium uncertainty when a “2,” “3,” “8,” “9”
is drawn and have high uncertainty when a “4,” “5,” “6,” or “7” is
drawn. For a ﬁrst qualitative view on uncertainty, we split the data
according to these three levels and analyze their effect on changes
in pupil dilation after the ﬁrst card. A clear separation of pupil
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size arises quickly after the ﬁrst card is drawn (Figure 2A). The
less uncertainty there is about the outcome the more the pupil
dilates relative to its size before drawing the ﬁrst card. Signiﬁ-
cance of the difference between high and low uncertainty trials
is assessed by point-wise t -tests with respect to an alpha-level
adjusted for multiple testing to 0.05 expected false-discovery rate
(denoted as FDR0.05). We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect from 0.77 s after
the ﬁrst card until the second card is drawn (p < 0.042= FDR0.05).
Peak signiﬁcance (i.e., lowest p-value) is reached 1.66 s after the
ﬁrst card (Figure 2B). Hence, uncertainty has a quick and last-
ing effect on pupil dilation, which is robust across individuals
(Figure 3).
By splitting into three levels, the analysis was independent of
any particular model of uncertainty used. The present gambling
task involves risk, which neurally and behaviorally is the best stud-
ied form of uncertainty (Weber et al., 2004; Mohr et al., 2010).
Risk arises in situations where outcomes are probabilistic and
probabilities are known. The higher the risk, the less accurate
are reward predictions; hence higher risk will lead the decision
maker to expect larger and more frequent reward prediction
errors.
Our formulation of risk [see Mathematical Details – Models of
Expected Reward, Uncertainty (Risk), and Surprise (Risk Predic-
tion Error)] has been successfully applied to functional imaging
data (Preuschoff et al., 2008; d’Acremont et al., 2009), and readily
extends to include a measure of surprise (risk prediction errors).
After the ﬁrst card, the probability of winning (and thus the
expected reward) is linear in the ﬁrst card drawn (Figure 2C,
gray), while the risk is quadratic in the ﬁrst card (Figure 2C,
black). A coupling between pupil dilation and risk implies a qua-
dratic relationship between pupil dilation and the ﬁrst card. At
the time-point of highest difference between low and high uncer-
tainty (t = 1.66 s in Figure 2B) such a dependence is clearly visible
(Figure 2D, dots). A second order polynomial provides an excel-
lent ﬁt of the data (Figure 2D, solid line, norm of residuals 0.015).
When analyzing the temporal evolution of the effects of proba-
bility of winning and risk, respectively, we ﬁnd that the effect of
risk on pupil dilation increases rapidly reaching a plateau of −0.04
after about 1.6 s (Figure 2E). In contrast, the effect of probabil-
ity meanders around zero. The constant offset peaks about 1 s
after the ﬁrst card and returns to baseline before the second card is
drawn. This constant includes non-speciﬁc effects (such as arousal,
FIGURE 3 | Individual uncertainty. Pupil dilation split according to high
uncertainty (black) and low uncertainty (gray) after ﬁrst card for each of the 12
individuals, mean and SEM over trials. All observers show the same
qualitative behavior as the average effect shown in Figure 2A.
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novelty, etc.) that are independent of the ﬁrst card’s value and thus
independent of all decision variables. Although the ﬁts are sugges-
tive, technically, risk, reward, and offset are incommensurate, as
they are measured in units of $2, $, and 1 respectively, and thus
effect sizes could change based on a linear scaling of the reward.
To assess the signiﬁcance of the results independent of any lin-
ear scaling of the decision variables we studied the correlation
between pupil dilation on the one hand and probability or risk on
the other hand. This reveals a high negative correlation between
risk and pupil dilation (Figure 2F, top), which is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from 0 (p < FDR0.05 = 0.045) starting at t = 0.46 s till the
second card is drawn (Figure 2F, bottom). No signiﬁcant correla-
tion between probability and pupil dilation is found at any point
in time (r < 0.31; p > 0.17 throughout, Figure 2F). These data
show that pupil dilation after the ﬁrst card reﬂects the risk of the
outcome, not the probability of winning or expectation of reward.
Pupil after the ﬁrst card signals risk. Risk reﬂects the expec-
tation of errors and inﬂuences how reward prediction errors are
perceived: the more certain we were about the outcome – i.e., the
lower our risk was – the higher will be our surprise, if our expec-
tations are not met. Since violation of expectations necessitates
updating of beliefs, surprise has been suggested as a trigger signal
for learning. While surprise can be formalized in various ways,
e.g., as the improbability of an event (Shannon, 1948), it generally
captures the violations of our expectations beyond reward pre-
diction error. We here quantify surprise by risk prediction error
[Mathematical Details – Models of Expected Reward, Uncertainty
(Risk), and Surprise (Risk Prediction Error)]. After the ﬁrst card,
risk prediction error is identical to the negative risk plus a con-
stant offset. This coupling between risk and risk prediction error
is a common confound in risky decision making and independent
from the quantiﬁcation of risk and surprise. The current paradigm
allows us to dissociate the contribution of risk and risk prediction
errors to pupil dilation, by analyzing the data following the draw
of the second card. At this point participants know the outcome
of their bet and thus experience no more risk. However, partici-
pants can either be highly surprised (e.g., if a low risk ﬁrst card
yields an unexpected outcome) or lowly surprised (e.g., if a low
risk card yields an expected outcome). Consequently, the negative
correlation between risk and risk prediction errors that is inher-
ently present after the ﬁrst card, disappears after the second card
is drawn.
We again start with a qualitative view on surprise by splitting
the data after the second card into high and low surprise. Sur-
prise indeed shows an effect on pupil dilation, which is signiﬁcant
(p < FDR0.05 = 0.0077,Figure 4A) from0.79 to 1.56 s (Figure 4B),
and observed in all individuals (Figure 5). At the time of peak sig-
niﬁcance (t = 1.12 s) pupil dilation clearly follows the model of
surprise as risk prediction error (Figures 4C,D), irrespective of
whether the outcome is a win (gray) or a loss (black). The out-
come itself does not differentially affect the pupil (t -tests between
win and loss: p > 0.26 for all time-points). Quantitative analysis
shows a signiﬁcant correlation between risk prediction error and
pupil dilation at t = 1.12 s (r = 0.76; p = 0.0003, Figure 4E). This
signiﬁcant correlation (p < 0.042= FDR0.05) is observable early
after the card (from 0.18 to 0.24 s and at 0.55 s) and persists with
a short interruption (2.40–2.48 s) from 0.80 s till the participant
FIGURE 4 | Second card. (A) Pupil dilation after the second card depending
on whether surprise is high (gray) or low (black) after the second card. To
include all data, high surprise here is deﬁned to occur when expected
reward prior to the second card was positive and the actual outcome is a
loss (P 1 >0 and P 2 =−$1) or when the expected reward was negative and
the actual outcome is a win (P 1 <0 and P 2 =+$1); conversely, if expected
reward had been positive and outcome is a win (P 1 >0 and P 2 =$1) or
expected reward had been negative and outcome is a loss (P 1 <0 and
P 2 =−$1), surprise is low. Otherwise notation as in Figure 2A. (B)
Signiﬁcance of difference between high and low surprise according to (A).
Notation as in Figure 2B. (C) Model: Risk prediction error (RE2) as measure
of surprise after the draw of the second card as function of ﬁrst card (c∗)
and actual outcome (P 2: win or loss). Note that there are no data for (c∗ =1,
win) and for (c∗ =10, loss), since c∗ =1 implies pwin,1 =0 and thus certain
loss (P 2 =−$1) as well as c∗ =10 implies pwin,1 =1 and thus certain win
(P 2 =+$1), (D) Points: Pupil dilation at peak signiﬁcance of (A,B) (t =1.12 s
after second card) split by ﬁrst card (c∗) and outcome (P 2: win or loss);
mean and SEM over participants. Lines: ﬁts of risk prediction error (RE2)
according to (C). (E) Correlation of risk prediction error (RE2) as quantitative
measure of surprise and pupil dilation at time point of peak signiﬁcance. (F)
Time course of correlation in (E) for the period after the second card.Top:
correlation coefﬁcient, bottom: probability of correlation being different from
0. Horizontal line: alpha-level for expected FDR of 5% (FDR0.05 =0.042).
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FIGURE 5 | Individual surprise. Pupil dilation split according to high surprise (gray) and low surprise (black) after second card for each of the 12 individuals,
mean and SEM over trials. All observers show the same qualitative behavior as the average effect shown in Figure 4A.
FIGURE 6 | Alternative measures of surprise.Timecourse of correlation between other measures of surprise (left: squared reward prediction error; right:
absolute reward prediction error a.k.a. salience) and pupil dilation. Notation as in top panel of Figure 4F.
is asked to indicate the outcome (Figure 4F). The data follow-
ing the second card show that pupil dilation observed at the ﬁrst
and second card is related to the risk prediction error (surprise)
rather than risk (expected uncertainty). Other formalizations of
surprise exist in decision making (e.g., absolute reward prediction
error, see Appendix,Figure 6), but are correlated to risk prediction
error. Irrespective of the precise formulation, our data show a clear
and robust effect of surprise.
DISCUSSION
Pupil dilation serves as a cue in social interactions: wide pupils
are commonly associated with attractiveness (the natural source
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of atropine being referred to as “bella-donna” – beautiful woman)
and enhance social valence judgment in others (Harrison et al.,
2006). Poker players, for instance, try to hide information by wear-
ing sunglasses,butwhat informationwould their pupil betray? The
present study is the ﬁrst to dissociate speciﬁc decision variables
from each other independent of the act of decision making. We
demonstrate that pupil dilation reﬂects surprise but not expected
reward.
A general effect of decision making and arousal on pupil dila-
tion has been known since the 1960s (Bradshaw, 1967; Simpson
and Hale, 1969) and recent data links the timing of dilation to
the timing of the decision (Einhäuser et al., 2010). Quantitative
data on the relation between speciﬁc decision variables and pupil
responses has, however, remained scarce. A qualitative concept
related to the notion of surprise is the well-known “probabil-
ity effect” (Friedman et al., 1973): rarer stimuli evoke a larger
pupil response. Similarly, violations of a temporal sequence yield
increases in pupil size,whose timing is related to the violating event
(Raisig et al., 2010). While both paradigms deal with an intuitive
notion of surprise (oddity or sequence violations, respectively),
such studies modulate the probability of an event to occur and
thus by design do not aim at assessing or dissociating variables
like risk and reward.
Interestingly, paradigms using the probability effect often assert
that higher uncertainty is associated with more task engagement
or more arousal (Friedman et al., 1973). While we do not dispute
that there is an effect of such unspeciﬁc variables on pupil dilation
(in fact, the constant in Figure 2E likely subsumes such variables),
our paradigmkeeps task engagement constant,while decision vari-
ables are varied. Complementary to our approach, recent studies
indeedﬁnd that shifts between task engagement (exploitation) and
disengagement (exploration) affect the pupil response (Gilzen-
rat et al., 2010; Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011), consistent with
the adaptive gain theory of LC–NA function (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). The experimental design and modeling focused on
choice and neither aimed at nor allowed a dissociation of deci-
sion variables, in particular of expected reward and risk. The
high correlation between these two variables in their paradigm
yielded Gilzenrat et al. (2010) to conjecture that pupil dilation
may reﬂect expected reward. Notwithstanding the important con-
tribution of this study in the context of task engagement, their
conjecture on the role of expected reward is clearly rejected by our
present results.
The relation of pupil diameter to uncertainty and expected
reward has recently been addressed by Satterthwaite et al. (2007).
However, as the authors point out, “interpretation of results
. . . may be complicated” due to the correlation of uncertainty
and reward expectation in their paradigm. It is this correla-
tion that our paradigm eliminates and that allows us to unam-
biguously interpret the results in terms of expected reward and
uncertainty.
The neural basis of reward-processing is well established.
Research in this area has been driven by the quantitative predic-
tions of the reward prediction error hypothesis, which was ﬁrst pro-
posed in the late 1990s (Montague et al., 1996) andhas since gained
a wealth of evidence (Schultz et al., 1997; Schultz, 2010). The
hypothesis posits that the neurotransmitter dopamine supports
reward-based learning through signaling of reward prediction
errors (Schultz, 2000). Neural responses to expected reward and
reward prediction errors have been identiﬁed for the dopaminer-
gic nuclei of the brain stem as well as their projection areas such as
the basal ganglia, orbitofrontal cortex, insular cortex, cerebellum
and parietal cortex (Schultz, 2010). The reward prediction error
hypothesis has led to sophisticated neural models that integrate
these areas into a reward-processing network, allow analyzing con-
nectivity quantitatively and provide the theoretical framework for
reward-based learning.
The neurophysiological basis of uncertainty signals is less well
understood. Neural responses to different forms of uncertainty
(e.g., prediction risk, prediction risk errors, volatility) have been
reported for the human anterior insula (Preuschoff et al., 2008; De
Martino et al., 2009; d’Acremont et al., 2009), rodent orbitofrontal
cortex (Kepecs et al., 2008), non-human primate parietal cortex
(Kiani and Shadlen, 2009), the human striatum (Preuschoff et al.,
2006), human anterior cingulate cortex (Behrens et al., 2007) as
well as for the tonic dopamine response in non-human primates
(Fiorillo et al., 2003). However, while theoretical frameworks
have been proposed on how uncertainty could be incorporated
in reward learning and how uncertainty itself could be learned
(Pearce and Hall, 1980; Mihatsch and Neuneier, 2002; Yu and
Dayan, 2005; Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007; Preuschoff et al.,
2008) a systematic physiological and neural analysis for uncer-
tainty akin to the analysis of the reward prediction error hypothesis
of dopamine is lacking. By using the pupil as a peripheral physio-
logical signal, the present study – under the assumption that pupil
dilation reﬂects NA levels – provides experimental support for a
similar risk prediction error hypothesis of NA.
Several lines of evidence converge in favor of a link between
pupil dilation and NA levels (Samuels and Szabadi, 2008 for
review), including anatomy (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011 for review),
pharmacology in healthy observers and patients (Koss, 1986;
Phillips et al., 2000; Jepma et al., 2011), monkey electrophysiology
(Rajkowski et al., 1993) and human imaging (Sterpenich et al.,
2006, but see Astaﬁev et al., 2010). While for several of these lines
of evidence the interpretation has remained controversial and a
direct demonstration of the relation between pupil dilation and
LC activity may still be lacking, taken together these data make the
pupil/NA link a viable working assumption at the very least. Under
this assumption, our data suggest that NA signals risk prediction
error as a form of surprise, rather than other decision variables
such as probability of outcomes or expected reward. Thus we pro-
vide further experimental evidence for recent theoretical models
(Bouret and Sara, 2005;Dayan andYu, 2006; Sara, 2009). Notwith-
standing the inﬂuence of other cognitive factors,which the current
paradigm does not differentially assess, on pupil dilation, NA in
this view signals errors related to estimates of uncertainty and thus
guides both behavior and learning about uncertainty. This risk pre-
diction error hypothesis of NA parallels the reward prediction error
hypothesis of dopamine. Indeed, the hypothesis that risk prediction
errors can be used for learning about risk akin to learning about
reward through reward prediction errors has found recent support
from imaging studies (Preuschoff et al., 2008; d’Acremont et al.,
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2009;Tobler et al., 2009), electrophysiological data of adaptive cod-
ing (Tobler et al., 2005) as well as computational models of risk
learning (Dayan and Yu, 2006; Preuschoff and Bossaerts, 2007).
Notwithstanding the inﬂuence of other neuromodulators (e.g.,
ACh) on pupil dilation, our data thus suggest that NA may play a
similar role for learning about uncertainty as dopamine does for
learning about reward.
Our ﬁndings expand the current knowledge of risk perception
and misperception, which holds promise for our understanding
of normal and pathological decision making. In particular, risk
misperception characterizes many mental illnesses, from anxiety
and mood disorders (Paulus and Stein, 2006) to addiction and
pathological gambling (Bechara, 2003). To date, risk perception in
clinical populations is studied largely as a high-level prefrontal and
insular process. However, by relating risk perception to the nora-
drenergic system, our results reframe risk perception as a much
lower-level process, and locate it in the structure most directly
implicated in arousal (Bradshaw, 1967), network reset (Bouret
and Sara, 2005) and (sub)optimal performance (Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). The temporal relation between LC discharge and
NA release to the pupillary response is as of now unknown and
the time constants and response amplitudes likely depend on sev-
eral factors, such as the overall illumination level and ACh levels.
Nonetheless, our data together with earlier studies suggest that
the earliest response happens in the range over several 10ms. This
high temporal resolution combined with the high spatial resolu-
tion of functional brain stem imaging (d’Ardenne et al., 2008) is
likely to eventually provide unique insights into the link between
the neural circuits of reward and uncertainty processing.
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APPENDIX
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF SURPRISE
In the context of decision making, surprise can be quantiﬁed
in a variety of ways. Besides our formalization of expected and
unexpected uncertainty, measures rooted in information theory,
such as (Shannon) entropy and (Shannon) surprise, are frequently
employed. The former is a measure of expected uncertainty in
that it captures the average expected surprise. This is analogous to
our risk, which captures the average expected size of the (squared)
reward prediction error. The information theoretic surprise, just as
our risk prediction error, is a measure of unexpected uncertainty,
and relates to a speciﬁc event, measuring how (un)expected it was
with respect to the entropy. Two formalizations particularly closely
related to our current formulation are absolute reward prediction
error (|PE2|), sometimes also referred to as salience, and squared
reward prediction error (PE22). In the present paradigm both mea-
sures are by deﬁnition strongly correlated with risk prediction
error (RE2),with correlations of 0.96 and 0.84, respectively.Hence,
it comes as no surprise that both show high correlations with pupil
dilation after the second card and a similar time course (Figure 6).
In fact, at the time point depicted in Figure 4D, the correlation
to |PE2| is slightly stronger, most likely because |PE2| – unlike
RE2 – takes its minimum for the extreme values (Table 2). Distin-
guishing the different formalizations of surprise has not been the
aim of the present paradigm, which primarily asked to dissociate
expected reward from (any measure of) surprise. The conclusion
that pupil dilation signals surprise, but not reward, is robust and
insensitive to the precise formalization (Figures 4A and 5).
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